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the dictionary definition of change 
means your face looks different in the water 
& even tho’you’d feel at home down there 
each moment spent at one remove, anywhere 
between the mammal & the sponge, 
you know you’d miss a particular cassette 
idle tears or a glass of gin 
& be irked by the serious options 
a changeless life presents e.g. ‘Minor 
poet, conspicuously dishonest’ would look funny 
on a plaque screwed to a tree 
while the blue trace of your former life 
suggests an exception 
generations will end up chanting; for them 
the parts of speech will need explaining 
not lakes or sleep or sex, 
or the dumb poets of the past 
who, being lyrical, missed out on this. 
— John forbes, ‘the Age of Plastic’
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but that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what 
is bound and is actual only in its context with others, should attain an 
existence of its own and a separate freedom—this is the tremendous 
power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure ‘i’.  
— g.w.f. hegel, ‘Preface’ to Phenomenology of  Spirit
by the 1920s, french philosophy was languishing in the soul-sapping shadow of berg-
sonian vitalism and academic neo-kantianism, when the suffocating crepuscular 
gloom was unexpectedly banished by the blaze of several new Russian suns. the two 
Alexes—koyrakskiy and kozevnikov, better known to posterity by their frenchified 
surnames koyré and kojève—definitively transformed the entire philosophical envi-
ronment of the twentieth century by irradiating the pallid Parisians with bursts of the 
heavy element hegelium. 
in a sequence of brilliant (if still under-appreciated) articles—coinciding with 
the centenary of the ignominious death of the Master from either cholera or a gas-
trointestinal disease—koyré not only undertook the task of giving the french their 
first proper introduction to hegel, but to improve the standing and understanding 
of hegelianism across the universe of thought. koyré’s essays, including ‘Rapport 
sur l’état des etudes hégéliennes en France’ (1930/31) and ‘Note sur la langue et la terminologie 
hégéliennes’ (1931), combine an extraordinary historical attentiveness with conceptual 
incisiveness and an often-striking turn of phrase. there are two features of koyré’s 
intervention worth noting here: first, the anomalous position that he sees hegel 
occupying in the history of thought, in part due to the encyclopaedic yet extreme 
difficulty of the german’s writings; second, the key role assigned in and by these 
writings to the power of language itself. the latter is so pivotal that koyré will even 
declare that: ‘hegelian terminology, and language in general, are full of more or 
less successful puns’.1 we shall see what becomes of this emphasis in later french 
enterprises.
As for kojève—who was, by the way, the nephew of the painter wassily kandin-
sky and who himself became one of the great bureaucratic architects of the european 
common Market after world war ii—he elaborated his notoriously aberrant explica-
tion of the Phenomenology of  Spirit in a famous series of seminars in the 1930s, mobbed by 
the most eminent local intellectual glitterati.2 Attended by Raymond Aron, georges ba-
taille, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, eric weil, Aron gurwitsch, André breton, and Jacques 
lacan, among others, the seminars quickly achieved legendary status; in their assem-
bled form, written up by Raymond Queneau, they submit the Phenomenology to a bizarre 
but compelling spin-doctoring.3
     1. A. koyré, Etudes d’histoire de la pensée philosophique, Paris, gallimard, 1971, p. 209.
     2. see M.s. Roth, ‘A Problem of Recognition: Alexandre kojève and the end of history,’ History and 
Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, 1985, p. 294.
     3. see A. kojève, Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel, ed. A. bloom, trans. J.h. nichols, new York and lon-
don, basic books, 1969).
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what, then, was compelling about kojève’s seminar? it:
1. identified hegel as the crucial philosopher of modernity;
2. identified the anthropological elements as crucial to hegel’s philosophy;
3. identified temporality as crucial to this anthropology;
4. identified the master/slave dialectic as crucial to this temporality;
5. identified the struggle for recognition as crucial to the master/slave dialectic;
6. identified the epitome of this struggle in the self-seizure of self-consciousness as such;
7. identified the program of the self-seizure of self-consciousness as finished in and by 
and as the ‘end of history’.
it is having been infected by this eccentric misreading of hegel that subsequent twenti-
eth century french thought proceeds—and sometimes all the more powerfully for being 
founded on such a misreading. indeed, from about 1930 to 1960 the french became 
obsessed with hegel, and, in particular, the Phenomenology, in an unprecedented way. in 
other words, the Alexes founded an intense period of work by a number of extraordi-
nary, and extraordinarily diverse, major figures (many already mentioned above).4 the 
period closes with the work of Jacques Derrida, who simultaneously brings to the read-
ing of hegel an unrivalled rigour, intensity and import. this closure is accomplished 
between 1964 and 1974, between Derrida’s early work on ‘violence and metaphysics’ 
to Glas, and is all the more effective because, in giving hegel the greatest possible sig-
nificance (as, indeed, do others, such as Michel foucault), it opens new possibilities of 
circumscription and circumvention, new ways for philosophy.
As Derrida himself notes, the strong misreadings of hegel by the Alexes had some 
genuinely extraordinary benefits, particularly concerning the status of time:
koyré and kojève, recognized, contrary to heidegger, the ‘prevalence’ or the 
‘primacy’ of the future on the present in the Jena lectures. they did this in a non-
equivocal manner and with strong and powerful formulas…we should also not 
forget that koyré and kojève were amongst the first readers of heidegger; they 
also recognized this influence in their interpretations of hegel.5
     4. for extended (and often very different) accounts of the role of hegel in twentieth-century french 
thought, see b. baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, new York and london, Routledge, 
2003); J. butler, Subjects of  Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, new York, columbia uni-
versity Press, 1987); D.k. keenan (ed.), Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Albany, sunY, 2004).
     5. J. Derrida, ‘Preface: A time for farewells: heidegger (read by) hegel (read by) Malabou,’ in The Future of  
Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, preface by J. Derrida, london, Routledge, 2005, p. xxv. Derrida con-
tinues, of the ‘french reception of hegel,’ ‘there were few who did not situate their thought in the shadow of 
hegel and in the legacy left by kojève’s and koyré’s meditations. And not only in the more or less academic 
discipline of philosophy (lévinas, sartre, Merleau-Ponty, but also breton, bataille, klossowski, lacan, 
and so many others) and not only in that generation: Althusser, foucault, Deleuze, lyotard, all shared at 
least, with a few others, a sort of active and organized allergy, we could even say an organizing aversion, 
towards the hegelian dialectic. they all shared this trait, of situating themselves philosophically, and they 
did this explicitly, from this rejection,’ pp. xxv-xxvi. significantly enough, if one returns to one of Derrida’s 
most notorious essays, ‘Différance,’ there’s this: ‘here, a remark in passing, which i owe to a recent reading of 
a text that koyré (in 1934, in Revue d’histoire et de philosophie réligieuse and reprinted in his Etudes d’histoire de la 
pensée philosophique) devoted to ‘hegel in Jena’. in this text koyré gives long citations, in german, of the Jena 
Logic, and proposes their translation. on two occasions he encounters the expression differente Beziehung in 
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of all the so-called ‘post-structuralists’, Derrida was the one who turned to hegel in 
the most direct, extended and forceful way. very summarily, his work is exemplified 
by a double-movement: first, to criticise those who thought they had escaped hegel; 
second, to reread (in fact: to translate) hegel in such a way as to render him unrecognis-
able, ‘other to himself ’ (to resort to a banal expression). indeed, Derrida’s translation 
of Aufhebung as ‘la relève’ is such a brilliant intervention that even the proudly hegelian 
and virulently anti-Derridean Alain badiou will later grudgingly accept it (my own 
proposed english for Aufhebung would be, by the way, either ‘lift-off ’, as in, ‘we have 
lift-off ’, or ‘push-up’, as in push-up bra).6 what Derrida—and the other great french 
thinkers of the 1960s—managed to accomplish in regards to hegel was, among other 
things, his deanthropomythologising (pardon the neologism), the presentation of just 
how powerful and intricate the hegelian onto-logy was, and, finally, a kind of ‘new 
refutation of time’, to invoke J.l. borges’s brilliant little title. hence, among other 
french accomplishments, we find Deleuze’s radicalisation of Jean hyppolite’s sense 
that the sense of existence has to be located nowhere but in sense itself; or Althusser’s 
separation of the two Marxes by revivifying the concept of absent causality, and, later, 
of aleatory materialism.7
whatever one feels about deconstruction in particular as a philosophy, one must 
not underestimate just how crucial Derrida has been for the rereading of hegel. if, 
as even such adherents as Paul de Man and friedrich kittler note, Derrida can often 
miss what’s important in the texts he reads—this is because he reads them so closely. it 
is this quite extraordinary aspect of Derrida’s work that ought to be affirmed here: his 
rereading of the philosophical tradition on the basis of direct interventions into his con-
temporaries’ own readings of the aforesaid tradition. Derrida’s practice of interpreta-
hegel’s text. this word (different), with its latin root, is rare in german and, i believe, in hegel, who prefers 
vershieden or ungleich, calling difference Unterschied and qualitative variety Vershiedenheit. in the Jena Logic he 
uses the word different precisely where he treats of time and the present,’ Margins, trans. A. bass, sussex, the 
harvester Press, 1986, p. 13. ‘Différance’ itself is thereby proposed as a translation of hegel.
     6. see Derrida, Margins. As for badiou, speaking about the labarrière and Jarczyk french translation of 
the Logic: ‘i was not able to reconcile myself to translating aufheben by sursumer (to supersede, to subsume), 
as these translations propose, because the substitution of a technical neologism in one language for an 
everyday word from another language appears to me to be a renunciation rather than a victory. i have 
thus taken up J. Derrida’s suggestion: “relever,” “relève,”’ Being and Event, trans. o. feltham, london and 
new York, continuum, 2005, p. 488. Moreover, having broached this topic, i cannot resist adding giorgio 
Agamben’s own contribution to the problem. in The Time that Remains, he notes of the german transla-
tion of the Pauline word katargein, messianic fulfilment, that ‘luther uses Aufheben — the very word that 
harbours the double meaning of abolishing and conserving (aufbewahren and aufhören lassen) used by hegel 
as a foundation for his dialectic! A closer look at luther’s vocabulary shows that he is aware of the verb’s 
double meaning, which before him occurs infrequently. this means that in all likelihood the term acquires 
its particular facets through the translation of the Pauline letters, leaving hegel to pick it up and develop it,’ 
The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. P. Dailey, stanford, stanford university 
Press, 2005, p. 99.
     7. As louis Althusser, who in fact did his Master’s thesis on hegel, writes in ‘the Return to hegel: the 
latest word in Academic Revisionism’(1950), fulminated: ‘this great Return to hegel is simply a desper-
ate attempt to combat Marx, cast in the specific form that revisionism takes in imperialism’s final crisis: a 
revisionism of  a fascist type,’ The Spectre of  Hegel, trans. g.M. goshgarian, london, verso, 1997, p. 183.
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tion cannot be separated from its performative force; his rereadings are always also 
carefully-situated political interventions. hegel is right at the centre of this enterprise, 
for which the key texts remain Writing and Difference, Of  Grammatology, Margins of  Philos-
ophy, Dissemination and Glas. Derrida shows how heidegger, levinas, the structuralists 
and others have (often seriously) misunderstood hegel; how, even when they haven’t 
or at least do their best not to (bataille, maybe foucault), they cannot escape him; at 
the same time, Derrida also shows how hegel remains complicit with procedures that 
he is allegedly against, or how he fails on his own terms; and Derrida attempts to do 
all this in such a way as to evade the unparalleled recuperative powers of the dialectic. 
from the early 1960s, then, the explicit anti-hegelianism of french philosophy be-
comes part of its power, and, just as academic german philosophy is dissolving into 
conceptual irrelevance or delivering its best work as sociology and media studies, Paris 
becomes once again the true philosophical centre of the world, its revivification due 
precisely to this protracted encounter-struggle with hegel.8 from the mid-1970s to the 
present, however, hegel returns as a different kind of interlocutor: no longer the over-
whelming figure of 1930-60, he now regularly functions as a standard negative reference 
for philosophies of science, is reinterpreted happily through nuanced close readings, or 
treated as a great philosopher whose thought must be dealt with as absolute (if wrong), 
a key figure in the history of philosophy, if not in the philosophy of history. that’s where 
i think the french are today with their hegel: the Parisian triangle (as one says ‘ber-
muda triangle’) of exemplary error, neutral commentary, historical monument.
i have provided an indecently protracted preamble to this review because i do not 
believe that catherine Malabou’s book can be profitably understood without some sense 
of this context. indeed, The Future of  Hegel, as the ‘Acknowledgements’ confess, began life 
as a doctoral thesis under Derrida’s supervision. this fact alone should give a hint of 
Malabou’s extreme attentivenesss to previously overlooked or under-examined details of 
hegel’s text, especially the linguistic intricacies; her affiliative ingenuity in linking appar-
ently heterogeneous expositions of concepts to one another; and her heady immixture of 
interpretation and intervention, simultaneously restrained by its interpretative care and 
erudition and unleashed to the bogglingly ambitious, seeking nothing less than to blow 
hegel out of the encrusted continuum of history for radical new uses. 
this program therefore takes the problem of Hegel’s future as central. As the very title 
The Future of  Hegel immediately suggests, the problems are manifold. first, does hegel 
really have a future, that is, as a philosopher whose work will continue to persecute us, 
to have a bearing on thinking as such? second, does hegel even have a concept of the 
future, does he think the future? third, are we ourselves hegel’s future, have we our-
selves already been thought by hegel, and/or in what way will we have already been 
hegel’s future? these questions for Malabou are pressing, and they are inextricably 
linked. they also provide her with a matrix to proceed: the problematics of the event, 
of time, and of history are foregrounded from the start; as, indeed, are the associated 
     8. see badiou’s absolutely stunning ‘the Adventure of french Philosophy,’ New Left Review, september/
october 2005, pp. 67-77 for the best short account of the french innovations.
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problematics of false starts, of re-commencement, and of belatedness; not to mention 
the problems of eternity or atemporality.
in order to think these problematics through, Malabou turns to the concept—if that 
is what it is—of ‘plasticity’, Plastizität. here are her preliminary etymological remarks, 
concerning:
a term which itself, in its first sense, describes or designates the act of  giving form. 
the english and french substantives ‘plasticity’ and plasticité and their german 
equivalent, Plastizität, entered the language in the eighteenth century. they joined 
words already in use which had been formed from the same root: the substantive 
‘plastics’ (die Plastik), and the adjective ‘plastic’ (plastisch). All three words are derived 
from the greek plassein (πλασσειν), which means ‘to model’, ‘to mould’. ‘Plastic’, as 
an adjective, means two things: on the one hand, to be ‘susceptible to changes of 
form’ or malleable (clay is a ‘plastic’ material); and on the other hand, ‘having the 
power to bestow form, the power to mould’, as in the expressions, ‘plastic surgeon’ 
and ‘plastic arts’ (8).
Malabou goes onto emphasize the constant semantic extensions of ‘plasticity’ (including 
synthetics and explosives). Despite the self-evident linguistic interest of the term, one has 
to ask: why plasticity at all? Does it not have a very restricted field of application in he-
gel’s work? what could it possibly have to do with rethinking temporality and dialectics? 
After all, almost every reputable reading of the term in hegel gives it a rather circum-
scribed home in the realm of the fine arts, notably sculpture and tragedy; and, concomi-
tantly, locates its real effectivity in the distant classical past. stephen houlgate’s account 
is representative here: ‘“Plasticity” of character, in hegel’s view, is the living “sculptural” 
quality shown by those individuals who identify wholly with their ethical pathos’.9 for 
hegel, the great greek figures who achieve such plasticity in their exemplary and sub-
stantial individuality include Pericles, socrates, Plato, sophocles, and so on. one can 
see the point immediately. such plasticity was a stage, a mediated moment, in the pre-
history of modern subjectivity, one in which self-fashioning and immanent embodied 
becoming were precisely attainable as one and the same activity.
for Malabou, however, the term takes us a lot further than this. for ‘philosophi-
cal plasticity’ ‘characterizes the philosophical attitude’ as well as applying ‘to philos-
ophy itself, to its form and manner of being’(10). she cites the ‘Preface’ to the 1831 
Science of  Logic and the ‘Preface’ to the Phenomenology as evidence here—‘ein plastischer 
Vortrag’—that the ‘plastic individuality of the greeks thus acquires the value of a model 
for the ideal philosophical attitude’(10). And since ‘Absolute Relation’ is the ‘activity-of-
form’ (Formtätigkeit), ‘it is this “activity” that clearly indicates the very plasticity of  substance 
     9. s. houlgate, ‘hegel’s theory of tragedy,’ in s. houlgate (ed.), Hegel and the Arts, northwestern univer-
sity Press, 2007, p. 175. Aside from note 57, pp. 174-5, this is the only mention of the term ‘plasticity’ in the 
entire volume; in any case, it is given no real bearing on hegel’s philosophy in toto. Moreover, hegel com-
mentary generally underplays and restricts the sense of this term, even when it may seem central to the dis-
cussion. for instance, in John shannon hendrix’s Aesthetics and the Philosophy of  Spirit: From Plotinus to Schelling 
and Hegel, new York, Peter lang, 2005, though much hinges on the status of ‘the plastic arts,’ ‘plastic’ isn’t 
even deserving of an entry in the index. 
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itself ’(12). it is thus by attending to the hitherto-unactualised possibilities of plasticity in 
hegel that Malabou orients her entire account. indeed, she will make the very strong 
claim that plasticity ‘is, therefore, the point around which all the transformations of 
hegelian thought revolve, the centre of its metamorphoses’(13). in doing so, she tries to 
release hegel from the sclerotic grip of one dominant tradition of commentary, and at-
tempts to do so by precisely reading hegel more closely and carefully than this tradition 
has managed.
Yet the peculiar contingency of such a claim regarding the centrality of the concept 
of plasticity—a claim whose entire pertinence derives, as i have been suggesting, from 
the Parisian triangle of Malabou’s situation—entails that Malabou attend to the prob-
lem of contingency in hegel. to this end, she has recourse to an idiomatic french phrase 
‘voir venir’ (a phrase which poses some problems for the translator lisabeth During, who 
marks its difficulty in her little note on xlix). Malabou explains herself as follows: 
‘Voir venir’ in french means to wait, while, as is prudent, observing how events are 
developing. but it also suggests that other people’s intentions and plans must be 
probed and guessed at. it is an expression that can thus refer at one and the same 
time to the state of ‘being sure of what is coming’ (‘être sûr de ce qui vient’) and of ‘not 
knowing what is coming’ (‘ne pas savoir ce qui va venir’). it is on this account that the 
‘voir venir’, ‘to see (what is) coming’, can represent that interplay, within hegelian 
philosophy, of teleological necessity and surprise (13).
Seeing coming: it’s impossible not to sense an entire lineage of recent continental thought 
behind this little syntagm (blanchot, lacan, Derrida, lacoue-labarthe, nancy, Agam-
ben, etc.), in which a problematic of vision, timing, enjoyment and so on is invested with 
a political animus directed towards a rethinking of community as ‘unworking’, ‘inopera-
tive’, ‘advening’, ‘coming’.10 the syntagm, in high Derridean style, irreducibly (that is, 
according to Derrida’s own inventive and covert renomination of the hegelian vocabu-
lary, absolutely) encrypts the irresolvable doublet of anticipated certainty and uncertain 
expectation, of knowledge properly bound to necessity and of the impossibility of know-
ing the future, of phronetic patience and frenetic anxiety. 
to make such idiomatic word-play stick, particularly in the context of hegel inter-
pretation, Malabou has a lot of explaining to do. this brings us to another ambivalent 
benefit of post-Derridean readings of philosophy: the argument has to be made step by 
step with close reference to the text itself, and show itself to be proceeding as such; every 
term has to be carefully interrogated, and articulated with its cognates and affiliates 
throughout the corpus; consequences then have to be drawn regarding the new com-
prehension of that corpus, as of the history of its interpretation; finally, the reading may 
seek to open itself up to variants and dissidents, in a kind of auto-deconstruction. this 
procedure, moreover, immediately renders any summary or paraphrase otiose: convic-
tion must attend on demonstration, and this demonstration is at once unique (or, better, 
     10. see, for example, g. Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. M. hardt, Minneapolis, university of 
Minnesota Press, 1993); M. blanchot, The Unavowable Community, trans. P. Joris, station hill, 1988); J.-l. 
nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. P. connor et al., Minneapolis, university of Minnesota Press, 1991).
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as we ought to say these days, singular) and forever-to-be-repeated (or, rather, essentially 
iterable). As such, it’s a nightmare for a reviewer—you’ll have to take my word for it 
that Malabou’s demonstration is strong and convincing, without me ever being able to 
convey adequately why—and itself a function of what she is trying to argue for, the very 
future she is trying to see to come.
that said, a review can at least gesture towards some of the brute way-stations of 
such an itinerary. the first part of this book is ‘hegel on Man: fashioning a second 
nature’, which moves from a reading of the Anthropology and its narrative of the vicis-
situdes of the individuation of the properly human soul—that is, through problems of 
nature, animality, sensation, auto-affection, and habit—to hegel’s interpretation of Ar-
istotle’s De Anima—that is, of νους, sensation and understanding—to the relation of habit 
and organic life in The Philosophy of  Nature— involving adaptation and self-differentia-
tion—to conclude with the problem of greek subjectivity as the ‘becoming essential of 
the accident’.
the second part, ‘hegel on god: the turn of the Double nature’, follows hegel’s 
arguments regarding the necessity of the emergence of revealed religion as a precondi-
tion for modern (post-classical) subjectivity proper. in Malabou’s own words: ‘by replac-
ing passivity with plasticity as the interpretative key to the divine negativity, we will suggest 
a new reading of the relation between divine subjectivity and philosophical subjectiv-
ity, based on the double sense of the Death of god’(84). ingeniously extracting hegel’s 
account of christianity from the shadow clutches of his often-subtle theological com-
mentators—that is, philosophy and religion cannot be disassociated without falsifying 
hegel’s account—Malbou reminds us that, ‘[b]efore hegel, no one had philosophically 
interpreted the Death of god as the event of his self-negation, that is, as a moment of 
truth within god himself ’(105). the discussion that Malabou dedicates to this doubled 
kenosis is stunning, all the more effective for binding it to the dialectics of Vorstellung, and, 
finally, to the extraordinary image of a Plastic god of time.
the third part, ‘hegel on the Philosopher or, two forms of the fall’, forces Mala-
bou’s analysis further, against one of her real targets, the spectral presence of kojève 
and his interpretation of the ‘end of history’: that time in which time still passes but 
nothing essential happens, in an eternal sabbath of Mankind. for Malabou, of course, 
this is a poor interpretation, for: 
the moment of Absolute knowledge only causes the dialectical suppression of 
one certain time, one specific temporality. from this moment on, far from closing 
all horizons, Absolute knowledge announces in fact a new temporality, one born 
from the synthesis of two temporalities, the greek and the christian. the moment 
which dialectically gives rise to the two temporalities marks the emergence of a 
new era of plasticity in which subjectivity gives itself the form which at the same 
time it receives (133). 
one problem here, of course, and despite the strenuousness with which Malabou pur-
sues her idée fixe of the plastic, is that, for hegel, philosophy explicitly—and, not coinci-
dentally, in and as hegel himself—first, ‘seizes its own concept’, thereby completing the 
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journey of spirit as it completes itself, and, second, does this precisely by ‘looking back’ 
(Zurücksehen), thus becoming the ultimate hypotyposis of absolute spirit in this epoch-
al recapitulation and consummation. Malabou’s solution to this difficulty can by now 
hardly be unexpected: she reinjects the dialectic into itself, by asserting that hegel ‘in 
effect “sublates” aufheben into aufheben, Aufhebung into Aufhebung. the possibility of a new 
reading of Absolute knowledge emerges from this truly plastic operation’(145). take 
your pick of the translations, but it’s not unthinkable that hegel sublatingly sublates 
sublation, sublates sublation with sublation. it is also not unthinkable that Malabou’s 
project is a kind of heterodox contribution to the post-dialectical tendencies of contem-
porary philosophy, whether Deleuzean, lacanian (in its slovenian hegelian form), Ag-
ambinian, badiouan, whatever. in any case, it seems clear that she thereby blows hegel 
out of the Parisian triangle of history—as i said above, of error, commentary and mon-
ument—and into a new ‘space’ of thought.
And this is, to return to Malabou’s guiding thread, the power of plasticity for reshap-
ing a genuinely contemporary hegel:
hegel’s philosophy announces that the future, from now on, depends on the way 
the extraordinary and unexpected can only arise out of the prose of the well-known 
and familiar. Plasticity fulfils its promise for the future with its treatment of a past 
that has become rigid: if it plasticizes that past—by solidifying or laminating it—it 
also explodes that past, through what the french call plasticage or bombing (190).
one, however, wonders whether in an epoch whose apocalyptic fears are crystallised 
under the heading of ‘global warming’ and, still, ‘nuclear winter’, the plastic explosives of 
terrorists, and in which the oil-based phenomenon that is plastic implies unsustainability 
in itself, the neuroscientific obsessions with ‘neuroplasticity’, the cheesy geek enthusiasm 
for plastic action figures and hegel dolls, and so forth, whether ‘plasticity’ can achieve the 
destiny and rigour of a true philosophical concept in hegel’s concept of concept.
Yet this is exactly what Malabou has gone onto achieve with her subsequent work. 
in a series of further brilliant encounters with Derrida, hegel, psychoanalysis and the 
neurosciences, Malabou has extended the concept of plasticity in a number of different 
ways.11 Drawing on work on the ‘three plasticities’—developmental, modulational, and 
reparative—from the neurosciences, Malabou uses these discoveries to radically criticise 
the procedures and claims of traditional philosophical and analytical programs, in order 
to, as she puts it in her conclusion to Les nouveaux blessés, develop a new philosophical 
materialism. this entails, she affirms, refusing the slightest separation between the brain 
and thought, as well as between the brain and the unconscious. unsurprisingly, given 
her post-Derridean-hegelianism, this also entails the maintenance of a supercharged 
dialectic: ‘A reasonable materialism, in my view, would posit that the natural contradicts 
itself and that thought is the fruit of this contradiction’.12
     11. see, for example Les nouveaux blessés: De Freud à la neurologie, penser les traumatismes contemporains, Paris, 
bayard, 2007; What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. s. Rand, new York, fordham, 2008; La Chambre 
du milieu: De Hegel aux neurosciences, Paris, hermann, 2009; Plasticity at the Dusk of  Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, 
Deconstruction, trans. c. shread, new York, columbia, 2010; among others.
     12. Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, p. 82.
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in the end, therefore, what Malabou does, if anything, is show us that the reading of 
hegel has hardly begun; that it is, as yet, impossible to close the book on his philosophy 
without forgetting or foregoing philosophy itself; that the history of philosophy is itself 
integrally philosophy or it is not (that is, neither history nor philosophy); that this history, 
beyond any possible recapture by pragmatics, blasts us into a future from which brilliant 
fragments of hegelian negativity are already radiating back, conceptual supernovae 
erupting in the infinite void of energetically-metamorphosing being.
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